ImpactThe attacker can validate if a user exists by checking the time login returns. This timing difference can be used to enumerate valid usernames, after which an attacker could attempt brute force attacks.
PatchesThis vulnerability has been patched, implementing a timing-safe form login authenticator that ensures consistent response times regardless of whether a user exists or not.
Technical DetailsThe vulnerability was caused by different response times when:
* A valid username was provided (password hashing occurred)
* An invalid username was provided (no password hashing occurred)
The fix introduces a TimingSafeFormLoginAuthenticator that performs a dummy password hash verification even for non-existent users, ensuring consistent timing.
WorkaroundsNo workarounds are available. Users should upgrade to the patched version.
References * https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/03-Identity_Management_Testing/04-Testing_for_Account_Enumeration_and_Guessable_User_Account
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
References
History
Wed, 03 Sep 2025 19:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Mautic
Mautic mautic |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Mautic
Mautic mautic |
Wed, 03 Sep 2025 15:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
Wed, 03 Sep 2025 14:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | ImpactThe attacker can validate if a user exists by checking the time login returns. This timing difference can be used to enumerate valid usernames, after which an attacker could attempt brute force attacks. PatchesThis vulnerability has been patched, implementing a timing-safe form login authenticator that ensures consistent response times regardless of whether a user exists or not. Technical DetailsThe vulnerability was caused by different response times when: * A valid username was provided (password hashing occurred) * An invalid username was provided (no password hashing occurred) The fix introduces a TimingSafeFormLoginAuthenticator that performs a dummy password hash verification even for non-existent users, ensuring consistent timing. WorkaroundsNo workarounds are available. Users should upgrade to the patched version. References * https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/03-Identity_Management_Testing/04-Testing_for_Account_Enumeration_and_Guessable_User_Account | |
| Title | User Enumeration via Response Timing | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-204 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Mautic
Published: 2025-09-03T14:25:06.796Z
Updated: 2025-09-03T14:46:19.282Z
Reserved: 2025-09-02T08:28:30.562Z
Link: CVE-2025-9824
Updated: 2025-09-03T14:46:05.522Z
Status : Awaiting Analysis
Published: 2025-09-03T15:15:49.413
Modified: 2025-09-04T15:35:29.497
Link: CVE-2025-9824
No data.