Total
33659 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2021-47256 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-05-04 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/memory-failure: make sure wait for page writeback in memory_failure Our syzkaller trigger the "BUG_ON(!list_empty(&inode->i_wb_list))" in clear_inode: kernel BUG at fs/inode.c:519! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: Process syz-executor.0 (pid: 249, stack limit = 0x00000000a12409d7) CPU: 1 PID: 249 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 4.19.95 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO) pc : clear_inode+0x280/0x2a8 lr : clear_inode+0x280/0x2a8 Call trace: clear_inode+0x280/0x2a8 ext4_clear_inode+0x38/0xe8 ext4_free_inode+0x130/0xc68 ext4_evict_inode+0xb20/0xcb8 evict+0x1a8/0x3c0 iput+0x344/0x460 do_unlinkat+0x260/0x410 __arm64_sys_unlinkat+0x6c/0xc0 el0_svc_common+0xdc/0x3b0 el0_svc_handler+0xf8/0x160 el0_svc+0x10/0x218 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception A crash dump of this problem show that someone called __munlock_pagevec to clear page LRU without lock_page: do_mmap -> mmap_region -> do_munmap -> munlock_vma_pages_range -> __munlock_pagevec. As a result memory_failure will call identify_page_state without wait_on_page_writeback. And after truncate_error_page clear the mapping of this page. end_page_writeback won't call sb_clear_inode_writeback to clear inode->i_wb_list. That will trigger BUG_ON in clear_inode! Fix it by checking PageWriteback too to help determine should we skip wait_on_page_writeback. | ||||
| CVE-2021-47252 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-05-04 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: Avoid WARN_ON timing related checks The soft/batadv interface for a queued OGM can be changed during the time the OGM was queued for transmission and when the OGM is actually transmitted by the worker. But WARN_ON must be used to denote kernel bugs and not to print simple warnings. A warning can simply be printed using pr_warn. | ||||
| CVE-2021-47229 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-05-04 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: PCI: aardvark: Fix kernel panic during PIO transfer Trying to start a new PIO transfer by writing value 0 in PIO_START register when previous transfer has not yet completed (which is indicated by value 1 in PIO_START) causes an External Abort on CPU, which results in kernel panic: SError Interrupt on CPU0, code 0xbf000002 -- SError Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt To prevent kernel panic, it is required to reject a new PIO transfer when previous one has not finished yet. If previous PIO transfer is not finished yet, the kernel may issue a new PIO request only if the previous PIO transfer timed out. In the past the root cause of this issue was incorrectly identified (as it often happens during link retraining or after link down event) and special hack was implemented in Trusted Firmware to catch all SError events in EL3, to ignore errors with code 0xbf000002 and not forwarding any other errors to kernel and instead throw panic from EL3 Trusted Firmware handler. Links to discussion and patches about this issue: https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/commit/?id=3c7dcdac5c50 https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pci/20190316161243.29517-1-repk@triplefau.lt/ https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pci/971be151d24312cc533989a64bd454b4@www.loen.fr/ https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/1541 But the real cause was the fact that during link retraining or after link down event the PIO transfer may take longer time, up to the 1.44s until it times out. This increased probability that a new PIO transfer would be issued by kernel while previous one has not finished yet. After applying this change into the kernel, it is possible to revert the mentioned TF-A hack and SError events do not have to be caught in TF-A EL3. | ||||
| CVE-2021-47228 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-05-04 | 6.2 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/ioremap: Map EFI-reserved memory as encrypted for SEV Some drivers require memory that is marked as EFI boot services data. In order for this memory to not be re-used by the kernel after ExitBootServices(), efi_mem_reserve() is used to preserve it by inserting a new EFI memory descriptor and marking it with the EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME attribute. Under SEV, memory marked with the EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME attribute needs to be mapped encrypted by Linux, otherwise the kernel might crash at boot like below: EFI Variables Facility v0.08 2004-May-17 general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x3597688770a868b2: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 13 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.12.4-2-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:efi_mokvar_entry_next [...] Call Trace: efi_mokvar_sysfs_init ? efi_mokvar_table_init do_one_initcall ? __kmalloc kernel_init_freeable ? rest_init kernel_init ret_from_fork Expand the __ioremap_check_other() function to additionally check for this other type of boot data reserved at runtime and indicate that it should be mapped encrypted for an SEV guest. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] | ||||
| CVE-2021-47216 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-05-04 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: advansys: Fix kernel pointer leak Pointers should be printed with %p or %px rather than cast to 'unsigned long' and printed with %lx. Change %lx to %p to print the hashed pointer. | ||||
| CVE-2021-47215 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-05-04 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: kTLS, Fix crash in RX resync flow For the TLS RX resync flow, we maintain a list of TLS contexts that require some attention, to communicate their resync information to the HW. Here we fix list corruptions, by protecting the entries against movements coming from resync_handle_seq_match(), until their resync handling in napi is fully completed. | ||||
| CVE-2021-47212 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-05-04 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5: Update error handler for UCTX and UMEM In the fast unload flow, the device state is set to internal error, which indicates that the driver started the destroy process. In this case, when a destroy command is being executed, it should return MLX5_CMD_STAT_OK. Fix MLX5_CMD_OP_DESTROY_UCTX and MLX5_CMD_OP_DESTROY_UMEM to return OK instead of EIO. This fixes a call trace in the umem release process - [ 2633.536695] Call Trace: [ 2633.537518] ib_uverbs_remove_one+0xc3/0x140 [ib_uverbs] [ 2633.538596] remove_client_context+0x8b/0xd0 [ib_core] [ 2633.539641] disable_device+0x8c/0x130 [ib_core] [ 2633.540615] __ib_unregister_device+0x35/0xa0 [ib_core] [ 2633.541640] ib_unregister_device+0x21/0x30 [ib_core] [ 2633.542663] __mlx5_ib_remove+0x38/0x90 [mlx5_ib] [ 2633.543640] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x1e/0x30 [auxiliary] [ 2633.544661] device_release_driver_internal+0x103/0x1f0 [ 2633.545679] bus_remove_device+0xf7/0x170 [ 2633.546640] device_del+0x181/0x410 [ 2633.547606] mlx5_rescan_drivers_locked.part.10+0x63/0x160 [mlx5_core] [ 2633.548777] mlx5_unregister_device+0x27/0x40 [mlx5_core] [ 2633.549841] mlx5_uninit_one+0x21/0xc0 [mlx5_core] [ 2633.550864] remove_one+0x69/0xe0 [mlx5_core] [ 2633.551819] pci_device_remove+0x3b/0xc0 [ 2633.552731] device_release_driver_internal+0x103/0x1f0 [ 2633.553746] unbind_store+0xf6/0x130 [ 2633.554657] kernfs_fop_write+0x116/0x190 [ 2633.555567] vfs_write+0xa5/0x1a0 [ 2633.556407] ksys_write+0x4f/0xb0 [ 2633.557233] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1a0 [ 2633.558071] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca [ 2633.559018] RIP: 0033:0x7f9977132648 [ 2633.559821] Code: 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8d 05 55 6f 2d 00 8b 00 85 c0 75 17 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 58 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 41 54 49 89 d4 55 [ 2633.562332] RSP: 002b:00007fffb1a83888 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 2633.563472] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 00007f9977132648 [ 2633.564541] RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 000055b90546e230 RDI: 0000000000000001 [ 2633.565596] RBP: 000055b90546e230 R08: 00007f9977406860 R09: 00007f9977a54740 [ 2633.566653] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f99774056e0 [ 2633.567692] R13: 000000000000000c R14: 00007f9977400880 R15: 000000000000000c [ 2633.568725] ---[ end trace 10b4fe52945e544d ]--- | ||||
| CVE-2021-47201 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-05-04 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iavf: free q_vectors before queues in iavf_disable_vf iavf_free_queues() clears adapter->num_active_queues, which iavf_free_q_vectors() relies on, so swap the order of these two function calls in iavf_disable_vf(). This resolves a panic encountered when the interface is disabled and then later brought up again after PF communication is restored. | ||||
| CVE-2021-47189 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-05-04 | 6.3 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix memory ordering between normal and ordered work functions Ordered work functions aren't guaranteed to be handled by the same thread which executed the normal work functions. The only way execution between normal/ordered functions is synchronized is via the WORK_DONE_BIT, unfortunately the used bitops don't guarantee any ordering whatsoever. This manifested as seemingly inexplicable crashes on ARM64, where async_chunk::inode is seen as non-null in async_cow_submit which causes submit_compressed_extents to be called and crash occurs because async_chunk::inode suddenly became NULL. The call trace was similar to: pc : submit_compressed_extents+0x38/0x3d0 lr : async_cow_submit+0x50/0xd0 sp : ffff800015d4bc20 <registers omitted for brevity> Call trace: submit_compressed_extents+0x38/0x3d0 async_cow_submit+0x50/0xd0 run_ordered_work+0xc8/0x280 btrfs_work_helper+0x98/0x250 process_one_work+0x1f0/0x4ac worker_thread+0x188/0x504 kthread+0x110/0x114 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Fix this by adding respective barrier calls which ensure that all accesses preceding setting of WORK_DONE_BIT are strictly ordered before setting the flag. At the same time add a read barrier after reading of WORK_DONE_BIT in run_ordered_work which ensures all subsequent loads would be strictly ordered after reading the bit. This in turn ensures are all accesses before WORK_DONE_BIT are going to be strictly ordered before any access that can occur in ordered_func. | ||||
| CVE-2021-47187 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-05-04 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: dts: qcom: msm8998: Fix CPU/L2 idle state latency and residency The entry/exit latency and minimum residency in state for the idle states of MSM8998 were ..bad: first of all, for all of them the timings were written for CPU sleep but the min-residency-us param was miscalculated (supposedly, while porting this from downstream); Then, the power collapse states are setting PC on both the CPU cluster *and* the L2 cache, which have different timings: in the specific case of L2 the times are higher so these ones should be taken into account instead of the CPU ones. This parameter misconfiguration was not giving particular issues because on MSM8998 there was no CPU scaling at all, so cluster/L2 power collapse was rarely (if ever) hit. When CPU scaling is enabled, though, the wrong timings will produce SoC unstability shown to the user as random, apparently error-less, sudden reboots and/or lockups. This set of parameters are stabilizing the SoC when CPU scaling is ON and when power collapse is frequently hit. | ||||
| CVE-2021-47176 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-05-04 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/dasd: add missing discipline function Fix crash with illegal operation exception in dasd_device_tasklet. Commit b72949328869 ("s390/dasd: Prepare for additional path event handling") renamed the verify_path function for ECKD but not for FBA and DIAG. This leads to a panic when the path verification function is called for a FBA or DIAG device. Fix by defining a wrapper function for dasd_generic_verify_path(). | ||||
| CVE-2021-47174 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-05-04 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nft_set_pipapo_avx2: Add irq_fpu_usable() check, fallback to non-AVX2 version Arturo reported this backtrace: [709732.358791] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 456 at arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c:128 kernel_fpu_begin_mask+0xae/0xe0 [709732.358793] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc nft_nat nft_chain_nat nf_nat nft_counter nft_ct nf_tables nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink 8021q garp stp mrp llc vrf intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common skx_edac nfit libnvdimm ipmi_ssif x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp crc32_pclmul mgag200 ghash_clmulni_intel drm_kms_helper cec aesni_intel drm libaes crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper mei_me dell_smbios iTCO_wdt evdev intel_pmc_bxt iTCO_vendor_support dcdbas pcspkr rapl dell_wmi_descriptor wmi_bmof sg i2c_algo_bit watchdog mei acpi_ipmi ipmi_si button nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler ip_tables x_tables autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor sd_mod t10_pi crc_t10dif crct10dif_generic raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic raid1 raid0 multipath linear md_mod ahci libahci tg3 libata xhci_pci libphy xhci_hcd ptp usbcore crct10dif_pclmul crct10dif_common bnxt_en crc32c_intel scsi_mod [709732.358941] pps_core i2c_i801 lpc_ich i2c_smbus wmi usb_common [709732.358957] CPU: 3 PID: 456 Comm: jbd2/dm-0-8 Not tainted 5.10.0-0.bpo.5-amd64 #1 Debian 5.10.24-1~bpo10+1 [709732.358959] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R440/04JN2K, BIOS 2.9.3 09/23/2020 [709732.358964] RIP: 0010:kernel_fpu_begin_mask+0xae/0xe0 [709732.358969] Code: ae 54 24 04 83 e3 01 75 38 48 8b 44 24 08 65 48 33 04 25 28 00 00 00 75 33 48 83 c4 10 5b c3 65 8a 05 5e 21 5e 76 84 c0 74 92 <0f> 0b eb 8e f0 80 4f 01 40 48 81 c7 00 14 00 00 e8 dd fb ff ff eb [709732.358972] RSP: 0018:ffffbb9700304740 EFLAGS: 00010202 [709732.358976] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000000001 [709732.358979] RDX: ffffbb9700304970 RSI: ffff922fe1952e00 RDI: 0000000000000003 [709732.358981] RBP: ffffbb9700304970 R08: ffff922fc868a600 R09: ffff922fc711e462 [709732.358984] R10: 000000000000005f R11: ffff922ff0b27180 R12: ffffbb9700304960 [709732.358987] R13: ffffbb9700304b08 R14: ffff922fc664b6c8 R15: ffff922fc664b660 [709732.358990] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92371fec0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [709732.358993] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [709732.358996] CR2: 0000557a6655bdd0 CR3: 000000026020a001 CR4: 00000000007706e0 [709732.358999] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [709732.359001] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [709732.359003] PKRU: 55555554 [709732.359005] Call Trace: [709732.359009] <IRQ> [709732.359035] nft_pipapo_avx2_lookup+0x4c/0x1cba [nf_tables] [709732.359046] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 [709732.359054] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xb0 [709732.359061] ? record_times+0x16/0x80 [709732.359068] ? plist_add+0xc1/0x100 [709732.359073] ? psi_group_change+0x47/0x230 [709732.359079] ? skb_clone+0x4d/0xb0 [709732.359085] ? enqueue_task_rt+0x22b/0x310 [709732.359098] ? bnxt_start_xmit+0x1e8/0xaf0 [bnxt_en] [709732.359102] ? packet_rcv+0x40/0x4a0 [709732.359121] nft_lookup_eval+0x59/0x160 [nf_tables] [709732.359133] nft_do_chain+0x350/0x500 [nf_tables] [709732.359152] ? nft_lookup_eval+0x59/0x160 [nf_tables] [709732.359163] ? nft_do_chain+0x364/0x500 [nf_tables] [709732.359172] ? fib4_rule_action+0x6d/0x80 [709732.359178] ? fib_rules_lookup+0x107/0x250 [709732.359184] nft_nat_do_chain+0x8a/0xf2 [nft_chain_nat] [709732.359193] nf_nat_inet_fn+0xea/0x210 [nf_nat] [709732.359202] nf_nat_ipv4_out+0x14/0xa0 [nf_nat] [709732.359207] nf_hook_slow+0x44/0xc0 [709732.359214] ip_output+0xd2/0x100 [709732.359221] ? __ip_finish_output+0x210/0x210 [709732.359226] ip_forward+0x37d/0x4a0 [709732.359232] ? ip4_key_hashfn+0xb0/0xb0 [709732.359238] ip_subli ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2021-47167 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-05-04 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFS: Fix an Oopsable condition in __nfs_pageio_add_request() Ensure that nfs_pageio_error_cleanup() resets the mirror array contents, so that the structure reflects the fact that it is now empty. Also change the test in nfs_pageio_do_add_request() to be more robust by checking whether or not the list is empty rather than relying on the value of pg_count. | ||||
| CVE-2021-47160 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-05-04 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: dsa: mt7530: fix VLAN traffic leaks PCR_MATRIX field was set to all 1's when VLAN filtering is enabled, but was not reset when it is disabled, which may cause traffic leaks: ip link add br0 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 ip link add br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 ip link set swp0 master br0 ip link set swp1 master br1 ip link set br0 type bridge vlan_filtering 0 ip link set br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 0 # traffic in br0 and br1 will start leaking to each other As port_bridge_{add,del} have set up PCR_MATRIX properly, remove the PCR_MATRIX write from mt7530_port_set_vlan_aware. | ||||
| CVE-2021-47146 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-05-04 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mld: fix panic in mld_newpack() mld_newpack() doesn't allow to allocate high order page, only order-0 allocation is allowed. If headroom size is too large, a kernel panic could occur in skb_put(). Test commands: ip netns del A ip netns del B ip netns add A ip netns add B ip link add veth0 type veth peer name veth1 ip link set veth0 netns A ip link set veth1 netns B ip netns exec A ip link set lo up ip netns exec A ip link set veth0 up ip netns exec A ip -6 a a 2001:db8:0::1/64 dev veth0 ip netns exec B ip link set lo up ip netns exec B ip link set veth1 up ip netns exec B ip -6 a a 2001:db8:0::2/64 dev veth1 for i in {1..99} do let A=$i-1 ip netns exec A ip link add ip6gre$i type ip6gre \ local 2001:db8:$A::1 remote 2001:db8:$A::2 encaplimit 100 ip netns exec A ip -6 a a 2001:db8:$i::1/64 dev ip6gre$i ip netns exec A ip link set ip6gre$i up ip netns exec B ip link add ip6gre$i type ip6gre \ local 2001:db8:$A::2 remote 2001:db8:$A::1 encaplimit 100 ip netns exec B ip -6 a a 2001:db8:$i::2/64 dev ip6gre$i ip netns exec B ip link set ip6gre$i up done Splat looks like: kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:110! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.12.0+ #891 Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x15d/0x15f Code: 92 fe 4c 8b 4c 24 10 53 8b 4d 70 45 89 e0 48 c7 c7 00 ae 79 83 41 57 41 56 41 55 48 8b 54 24 a6 26 f9 ff <0f> 0b 48 8b 6c 24 20 89 34 24 e8 4a 4e 92 fe 8b 34 24 48 c7 c1 20 RSP: 0018:ffff88810091f820 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000089 RBX: ffff8881086e9000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000089 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffed1020123efb RBP: ffff888005f6eac0 R08: ffffed1022fc0031 R09: ffffed1022fc0031 R10: ffff888117e00187 R11: ffffed1022fc0030 R12: 0000000000000028 R13: ffff888008284eb0 R14: 0000000000000ed8 R15: 0000000000000ec0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888117c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f8b801c5640 CR3: 0000000033c2c006 CR4: 00000000003706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ? ip6_mc_hdr.isra.26.constprop.46+0x12a/0x600 ? ip6_mc_hdr.isra.26.constprop.46+0x12a/0x600 skb_put.cold.104+0x22/0x22 ip6_mc_hdr.isra.26.constprop.46+0x12a/0x600 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x91/0xc0 mld_newpack+0x398/0x8f0 ? ip6_mc_hdr.isra.26.constprop.46+0x600/0x600 ? lock_contended+0xc40/0xc40 add_grhead.isra.33+0x280/0x380 add_grec+0x5ca/0xff0 ? mld_sendpack+0xf40/0xf40 ? lock_downgrade+0x690/0x690 mld_send_initial_cr.part.34+0xb9/0x180 ipv6_mc_dad_complete+0x15d/0x1b0 addrconf_dad_completed+0x8d2/0xbb0 ? lock_downgrade+0x690/0x690 ? addrconf_rs_timer+0x660/0x660 ? addrconf_dad_work+0x73c/0x10e0 addrconf_dad_work+0x73c/0x10e0 Allowing high order page allocation could fix this problem. | ||||
| CVE-2021-47145 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-05-04 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: do not BUG_ON in link_to_fixup_dir While doing error injection testing I got the following panic kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:1862! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 7836 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.13.0-rc1+ #305 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:link_to_fixup_dir+0xd5/0xe0 RSP: 0018:ffffb5800180fa30 EFLAGS: 00010216 RAX: fffffffffffffffb RBX: 00000000fffffffb RCX: ffff8f595287faf0 RDX: ffffb5800180fa37 RSI: ffff8f5954978800 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff8f5953af9450 R08: 0000000000000019 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 000151f408682970 R11: 0000000120021001 R12: ffff8f5954978800 R13: ffff8f595287faf0 R14: ffff8f5953c77dd0 R15: 0000000000000065 FS: 00007fc5284c8c40(0000) GS:ffff8f59bbd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fc5287f47c0 CR3: 000000011275e002 CR4: 0000000000370ee0 Call Trace: replay_one_buffer+0x409/0x470 ? btree_read_extent_buffer_pages+0xd0/0x110 walk_up_log_tree+0x157/0x1e0 walk_log_tree+0xa6/0x1d0 btrfs_recover_log_trees+0x1da/0x360 ? replay_one_extent+0x7b0/0x7b0 open_ctree+0x1486/0x1720 btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xea ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x12f/0x240 legacy_get_tree+0x24/0x40 vfs_get_tree+0x22/0xb0 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 btrfs_mount+0x10d/0x380 ? vfs_parse_fs_string+0x4d/0x90 legacy_get_tree+0x24/0x40 vfs_get_tree+0x22/0xb0 path_mount+0x433/0xa10 __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae We can get -EIO or any number of legitimate errors from btrfs_search_slot(), panicing here is not the appropriate response. The error path for this code handles errors properly, simply return the error. | ||||
| CVE-2021-47117 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-05-04 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: fix bug on in ext4_es_cache_extent as ext4_split_extent_at failed We got follow bug_on when run fsstress with injecting IO fault: [130747.323114] kernel BUG at fs/ext4/extents_status.c:762! [130747.323117] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP ...... [130747.334329] Call trace: [130747.334553] ext4_es_cache_extent+0x150/0x168 [ext4] [130747.334975] ext4_cache_extents+0x64/0xe8 [ext4] [130747.335368] ext4_find_extent+0x300/0x330 [ext4] [130747.335759] ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x74/0x1178 [ext4] [130747.336179] ext4_map_blocks+0x2f4/0x5f0 [ext4] [130747.336567] ext4_mpage_readpages+0x4a8/0x7a8 [ext4] [130747.336995] ext4_readpage+0x54/0x100 [ext4] [130747.337359] generic_file_buffered_read+0x410/0xae8 [130747.337767] generic_file_read_iter+0x114/0x190 [130747.338152] ext4_file_read_iter+0x5c/0x140 [ext4] [130747.338556] __vfs_read+0x11c/0x188 [130747.338851] vfs_read+0x94/0x150 [130747.339110] ksys_read+0x74/0xf0 This patch's modification is according to Jan Kara's suggestion in: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/linux-ext4/patch/20210428085158.3728201-1-yebin10@huawei.com/ "I see. Now I understand your patch. Honestly, seeing how fragile is trying to fix extent tree after split has failed in the middle, I would probably go even further and make sure we fix the tree properly in case of ENOSPC and EDQUOT (those are easily user triggerable). Anything else indicates a HW problem or fs corruption so I'd rather leave the extent tree as is and don't try to fix it (which also means we will not create overlapping extents)." | ||||
| CVE-2021-47114 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-05-04 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: fix data corruption by fallocate When fallocate punches holes out of inode size, if original isize is in the middle of last cluster, then the part from isize to the end of the cluster will be zeroed with buffer write, at that time isize is not yet updated to match the new size, if writeback is kicked in, it will invoke ocfs2_writepage()->block_write_full_page() where the pages out of inode size will be dropped. That will cause file corruption. Fix this by zero out eof blocks when extending the inode size. Running the following command with qemu-image 4.2.1 can get a corrupted coverted image file easily. qemu-img convert -p -t none -T none -f qcow2 $qcow_image \ -O qcow2 -o compat=1.1 $qcow_image.conv The usage of fallocate in qemu is like this, it first punches holes out of inode size, then extend the inode size. fallocate(11, FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE|FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE, 2276196352, 65536) = 0 fallocate(11, 0, 2276196352, 65536) = 0 v1: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-fsdevel/msg193999.html v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20210525093034.GB4112@quack2.suse.cz/T/ | ||||
| CVE-2021-47099 | 2 Linux, Redhat | 4 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux, Rhel Eus and 1 more | 2025-05-04 | 6 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: veth: ensure skb entering GRO are not cloned. After commit d3256efd8e8b ("veth: allow enabling NAPI even without XDP"), if GRO is enabled on a veth device and TSO is disabled on the peer device, TCP skbs will go through the NAPI callback. If there is no XDP program attached, the veth code does not perform any share check, and shared/cloned skbs could enter the GRO engine. Ignat reported a BUG triggered later-on due to the above condition: [ 53.970529][ C1] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:3574! [ 53.981755][ C1] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI [ 53.982634][ C1] CPU: 1 PID: 19 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc5+ #25 [ 53.982634][ C1] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 [ 53.982634][ C1] RIP: 0010:skb_shift+0x13ef/0x23b0 [ 53.982634][ C1] Code: ea 03 0f b6 04 02 48 89 fa 83 e2 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 41 0c 00 00 41 80 7f 02 00 4d 8d b5 d0 00 00 00 0f 85 74 f5 ff ff <0f> 0b 4d 8d 77 20 be 04 00 00 00 4c 89 44 24 78 4c 89 f7 4c 89 8c [ 53.982634][ C1] RSP: 0018:ffff8881008f7008 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 53.982634][ C1] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881180b4c80 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 53.982634][ C1] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffff8881180b4d3c RDI: ffff88810bc9cac2 [ 53.982634][ C1] RBP: ffff8881008f70b8 R08: ffff8881180b4cf4 R09: ffff8881180b4cf0 [ 53.982634][ C1] R10: ffffed1022999e5c R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000590 [ 53.982634][ C1] R13: ffff88810f940c80 R14: ffff88810f940d50 R15: ffff88810bc9cac0 [ 53.982634][ C1] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888235880000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 53.982634][ C1] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 53.982634][ C1] CR2: 00007ff5f9b86680 CR3: 0000000108ce8004 CR4: 0000000000170ee0 [ 53.982634][ C1] Call Trace: [ 53.982634][ C1] <TASK> [ 53.982634][ C1] tcp_sacktag_walk+0xaba/0x18e0 [ 53.982634][ C1] tcp_sacktag_write_queue+0xe7b/0x3460 [ 53.982634][ C1] tcp_ack+0x2666/0x54b0 [ 53.982634][ C1] tcp_rcv_established+0x4d9/0x20f0 [ 53.982634][ C1] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x551/0x810 [ 53.982634][ C1] tcp_v4_rcv+0x22ed/0x2ed0 [ 53.982634][ C1] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x96/0xaf0 [ 53.982634][ C1] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x1e0/0x2f0 [ 53.982634][ C1] ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x211/0x440 [ 53.982634][ C1] ip_list_rcv_finish.constprop.0+0x424/0x660 [ 53.982634][ C1] ip_list_rcv+0x2c8/0x410 [ 53.982634][ C1] __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x65c/0x910 [ 53.982634][ C1] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x5f9/0xcb0 [ 53.982634][ C1] napi_complete_done+0x188/0x6e0 [ 53.982634][ C1] gro_cell_poll+0x10c/0x1d0 [ 53.982634][ C1] __napi_poll+0xa1/0x530 [ 53.982634][ C1] net_rx_action+0x567/0x1270 [ 53.982634][ C1] __do_softirq+0x28a/0x9ba [ 53.982634][ C1] run_ksoftirqd+0x32/0x60 [ 53.982634][ C1] smpboot_thread_fn+0x559/0x8c0 [ 53.982634][ C1] kthread+0x3b9/0x490 [ 53.982634][ C1] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 53.982634][ C1] </TASK> Address the issue by skipping the GRO stage for shared or cloned skbs. To reduce the chance of OoO, try to unclone the skbs before giving up. v1 -> v2: - use avoid skb_copy and fallback to netif_receive_skb - Eric | ||||
| CVE-2021-47094 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-05-04 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86/mmu: Don't advance iterator after restart due to yielding After dropping mmu_lock in the TDP MMU, restart the iterator during tdp_iter_next() and do not advance the iterator. Advancing the iterator results in skipping the top-level SPTE and all its children, which is fatal if any of the skipped SPTEs were not visited before yielding. When zapping all SPTEs, i.e. when min_level == root_level, restarting the iter and then invoking tdp_iter_next() is always fatal if the current gfn has as a valid SPTE, as advancing the iterator results in try_step_side() skipping the current gfn, which wasn't visited before yielding. Sprinkle WARNs on iter->yielded being true in various helpers that are often used in conjunction with yielding, and tag the helper with __must_check to reduce the probabily of improper usage. Failing to zap a top-level SPTE manifests in one of two ways. If a valid SPTE is skipped by both kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_all() and kvm_tdp_mmu_put_root(), the shadow page will be leaked and KVM will WARN accordingly. WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3509 at arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c:46 [kvm] RIP: 0010:kvm_mmu_uninit_tdp_mmu+0x3e/0x50 [kvm] Call Trace: <TASK> kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x130/0x1b0 [kvm] kvm_destroy_vm+0x162/0x2a0 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_release+0x34/0x60 [kvm] __fput+0x82/0x240 task_work_run+0x5c/0x90 do_exit+0x364/0xa10 ? futex_unqueue+0x38/0x60 do_group_exit+0x33/0xa0 get_signal+0x155/0x850 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0xed/0x750 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xc5/0x120 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40 do_syscall_64+0x48/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae If kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_all() skips a gfn/SPTE but that SPTE is then zapped by kvm_tdp_mmu_put_root(), KVM triggers a use-after-free in the form of marking a struct page as dirty/accessed after it has been put back on the free list. This directly triggers a WARN due to encountering a page with page_count() == 0, but it can also lead to data corruption and additional errors in the kernel. WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1995658 at arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:171 RIP: 0010:kvm_is_zone_device_pfn.part.0+0x9e/0xd0 [kvm] Call Trace: <TASK> kvm_set_pfn_dirty+0x120/0x1d0 [kvm] __handle_changed_spte+0x92e/0xca0 [kvm] __handle_changed_spte+0x63c/0xca0 [kvm] __handle_changed_spte+0x63c/0xca0 [kvm] __handle_changed_spte+0x63c/0xca0 [kvm] zap_gfn_range+0x549/0x620 [kvm] kvm_tdp_mmu_put_root+0x1b6/0x270 [kvm] mmu_free_root_page+0x219/0x2c0 [kvm] kvm_mmu_free_roots+0x1b4/0x4e0 [kvm] kvm_mmu_unload+0x1c/0xa0 [kvm] kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x1f2/0x5c0 [kvm] kvm_put_kvm+0x3b1/0x8b0 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_release+0x4e/0x70 [kvm] __fput+0x1f7/0x8c0 task_work_run+0xf8/0x1a0 do_exit+0x97b/0x2230 do_group_exit+0xda/0x2a0 get_signal+0x3be/0x1e50 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x244/0x17f0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xcb/0x120 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40 do_syscall_64+0x4d/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Note, the underlying bug existed even before commit 1af4a96025b3 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Yield in TDU MMU iter even if no SPTES changed") moved calls to tdp_mmu_iter_cond_resched() to the beginning of loops, as KVM could still incorrectly advance past a top-level entry when yielding on a lower-level entry. But with respect to leaking shadow pages, the bug was introduced by yielding before processing the current gfn. Alternatively, tdp_mmu_iter_cond_resched() could simply fall through, or callers could jump to their "retry" label. The downside of that approach is that tdp_mmu_iter_cond_resched() _must_ be called before anything else in the loop, and there's no easy way to enfornce that requirement. Ideally, KVM would handling the cond_resched() fully within the iterator macro (the code is actually quite clean) and avoid this entire class of bugs, but that is extremely difficult do wh ---truncated--- | ||||